Analysis of Russia’s Ukraine War


What is happening on the Ukrainian front? Let’s look more at the tactical and operational situation. Let’s explain what Russia’s possible action plan might look like. Let’s point out the weaknesses and advantages. Let’s give an evaluation of the operation so that we have a document of the kind that we can explain by comparison in the future.

Of course this is a war! The parties are fighting at the cost of their blood. Everything can change. But intelligence makes a guess. He says that friends and enemies can do like this. He’ll have some references to look at. Assumptions have a basis. I also follow American and British military experts. As an expert, it is not possible to make a different estimation.

Belarusian President Lukashenko came to the agenda with an image. Lukashenko is explaining to the relevant people in front of a map. He also has explanations: He confirms that they launched Iskander missiles from their own territory, but says this war is not our war. On the map, an arrow reaches even Moldova. The map of Ukraine here, as expected, has four sectors.

On the map below, the sectors of Russia’s Ukraine campaign are marked. If Russia has made a master plan to invade the country (which it is), we should describe it in general: The operation is moving more towards Donbass (Sector II) and Crimea (Sector III) rather than the Kyiv sector (Sector I). From the east, north and south, priority can be given first to Kharkov and Mariupol, and then to Dnipro. After this stage, it can be aimed to reach Vinnytsia for the Russian troops, who rapidly traverse the country in the west direction in Sector III. The Kyiv sector, on the other hand, can be targeted last. Why not?

Let’s keep this master plan in mind for once. Now, let’s take a closer look at the situation by adding the developments to this.

In Ukraine, the operation is expanding slowly in Kyiv and Kharkov on the north-eastern front, and faster in Kherson in the southern part. Russia has more maneuvering possibilities in the Sea of ​​Azov region. Currently, Russia is trying to force the Azov coast. The distance from Odessa to Mariupol is about 400 miles. Odessa has a population of 1 million and Mariupol has a population of 430 thousand. When they attempt an “escape” from the coast, Ukraine will find no door to support logistics in the south. From Kherson you can proceed north, west. Russian troops advancing towards Mariupol make an important gain to establish the Crimean land-bridge. This situation separates Ukraine from Azov. At the same time, the troops to be connected to Kherson from Kharkov to the south completely cut off eastern Ukraine from the country.

While the Russian troops in Ukraine continue their operations to unite the pockets they have obtained, they are trying to increase their influence in the cities. The Ukrainian army and militias slowed the advance of the Russian forces in the cities.

While everyone is looking at the capital Kiev, if the developments in the south develop rapidly, this will be an important gain for Russia. (Of course, this alone is a military gain, politics or economics open up other issues.) Additional troops are deployed for Kyiv and Kharkov. So far, Russia has used 80 percent of its troops. Over time, the country can shift troops from the depths.

Russia used ground artillery, rocket, thermodynamic, air-launched guided missile. (The 3M54-1 Calibr used in the Kharkiv attack is launched from the aircraft, NATO Code: SS-N-7 or SS-N-30A, there are also these types.)

Russia has tactical/operational inadequacies. Vehicles and systems are outdated, logistical problems should be added to this. If it goes on like this, the operation will have delays for Russia.

At the beginning of the operation, my first observations were a little different. I said that Russia will probably implement a plan that will be effective. In fact, looking at the targets that Russia has chosen in Ukraine, I said to myself that this can be explained by a strategy of paralysis or close to it. But a week has passed in the operation, today the picture is quite different. Russia has worked too badly to pick the right target. Looking at the effective and modern works of the West, I say that Russia’s is far from implementing a paralysis strategy. Russia must be using a method that expresses the traces of the years 1960-80 when choosing a target. But a week later, we saw today, they shot down the Kyiv television antenna. If you can’t initially suppress command and control and paralyze the country’s defenses, you’re going to try very hard…

By contrast, Ukraine appears to lack precision ammunition and launch vehicles. It is not in vain that Zelensky asked for weapons support. If Ukraine provides precision ammunition, it will increase the possibility of surprise to Russia.

There seems to be some corruption and skill shortages in the Russian command in the field. If the determined targets are not captured as planned, the Russian army may be more aggressive, resulting in increased civilian casualties in Ukraine. Incompetence comes at a cost as city battles increase.

Attention focused on Kyiv and the Zelensky administration. But Russia could focus on the eastern sector first and then focus on Kiev.

Russia should have gained and maintained air superiority in Ukraine from the very beginning of the operation. Since it does not do this, the weapons and ammunition aids coming to Ukraine can be transported across the country by air-way bridge. Naval superiority has been established, the southern sector is under Russian influence. In terms of ground operations, the situation is as explained in this article.

The advantage that the Ukrainian troops receive the picture of the operation in real time should be considered. If this intelligence comes to the tactical and operative commander correctly and on time, it will be much more successful. U.S. and NATO support, as well as arms and ammunition aid, gives Ukraine the most advantage in this direction.

Those who command the Ukrainian army are the party that uses resources such as manpower, logistics and information correctly. We see an example of combat closer to today’s operations not on the Russian side, but on the Ukrainian side.

Russian nuclear submarines are on their way for exercises in the Barents Sea, near the Arctic, and mobile missile launchers are circling Siberia. The execution of these exercises began days after Russian President Putin ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be on high alert.

Russia discussed the possibility of a Third World War, where it could use its strategic troops and nuclear weapons. Russia wanted to globalize the issue since the tension period and reminded that the bill would be heavy. Following the escalation of global sanctions, nuclear threats from Russia were renewed. In this respect, Cold War 2 is being talked about. Sanctions began to be very extensive and effective. In this respect, it is said that there is a Global Economic War.

NOTE: Due to intellectual property rights, you can use this information by reference.

Gursel Tokmakoglu

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