Situation Assessment of the Ukraine-Russia War (G+20)

I stated that I would continue to monitor the war between Ukraine and Russia in terms of “operational objectives” by updating them in a certain format. After the published G+10 (Ukraine-Russia War Situation Assessment), this is the second in the form of a G+20 report. This time, we will be able to see the progress better with the comparative table. This analytical study is unique in its field in our country.

G+20 (Second 10 Days: 6-15 March 2022)

(According to the determined parameters desired to be obtained, the current level is expressed with the value determined by the direction of the target level and the feeling time.)

I. Withdrawal of the USA and its partners:

• Russia resisting sanctions (at 70% and if felt more than 1 year) – Current level is 10%
• China’s openly increasing support for Russia (at 50%) – Current level is 10%
• Increasing energy problem in Europe (at 60% level and if felt for 6 months) – Current level is 35%
• Increased risk of Nuclear War (at 30%, sensitive) – Current level is 5%

II. Putin’s renunciation:

• Pressure of Socio-Economic and Technological sanctions (if felt at 70% level and with increasing intensity for 4 months) – Current level is 40%
• Pressure of Socio-Political and Media sanctions (if felt at 70% level and with increasing intensity for 4 months) – Current level is 35%
• Increasing Ukrainian resistance (if felt at 50% level and 4 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 30%
• Increasing reactions from inner power centers (if it is felt at 50% level and 3 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 10%

III.a. Zelensky’s renunciation:

• Pressure from Russia (if felt at 50% level and 3 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 30%
• Pushing the people into difficult conditions (if felt at 50% level and 1 month with increasing intensity) – Current level is 40%
• The collapse of the Ukrainian infrastructure (if felt at 60% and 3 months with increasing severity) – Current level is 30%
• Russian control of Ukrainian resources (if felt at 60% level and 3 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 10%
• Army cuts off support (if felt at 80% level and 4 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 5%
• Kyiv falling (at 30%) – Current level is 5%
• US and its partners cut off active support (if felt at 10% level and 1 month) – Current level is 1%
• Invasion of the country (at 40% level) – Current level is 15%

II.b. The renunciation of the Ukrainian people:

• Pressure from Russia (if felt at 40% level and 4 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 30%
• Russia’s control of a certain part of the country’s territory (at 40%) – Current level is 15%
• Russian control of Kyiv, Odessa, Maniupol, Sumi and Kharkov (at 60%) – Current level is 30%
• The collapse of the Ukrainian infrastructure (if felt at 60% and 3 months with increasing severity) – Current level is 30%
• Russian control of Ukrainian resources (if felt at 60% level and 3 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 10%

III.c. Withdrawal of the Ukrainian army:

• Pressure from Russia (70% and 6 months if felt with increasing intensity) – Current level is 20%
• Interruption of foreign military aid (if felt at 80% level and 2 months with increasing severity) – Current level is 10%
• Cessation of militia support (if felt at 60% level and 3 months with increasing intensity) – Current level is 5%
• Cessation of leadership (if felt at 50% level and 1 month increased intensity) – Current level is 1%
• Russian control of Kyiv, Odessa, Maniupol, Sumi and Kharkov (at 60%) – Current level is 30%
• Losing Donbass resistance (at 80%) – Current level is 30%
• If the military units (especially the 93rd, 92nd, 81st, 95th, 54th, 17th, 57th, 72nd, 1st, 14th Brigades) cannot hold their areas and take heavy casualties (if felt at 80% level and 3 months increasing intensity) – Current level is 20%
• Disconnection from the sea (at 50% level) – Current level is 50%
• Losing Air Supremacy (at 30%) – Current level is 20%
• Invasion of 1/3 of the country’s territory (at 40% level) – Current level is 20%

Featured war/operation types and Expected Developments

• Global Economic War: It is developing in favor of the USA and against Russia.
• The Global Information War: It is developing in favor of Ukraine and its supporters, the United States, and its Partners.
• Tactical City Combat (Built-in Clash): If the Ukraine War cannot be resolved in the short/medium term, the risk of an Unconventional War becomes more evident.
• Conventional Combat: Operative level. It is in favor of Russia. Russia’s. If he proceeds with his plan normally, it can be expected to take G+3 months. Russia has begun to show its destructive effect more in cities where resistance is high. Odessa is surrounded. A Russian column that surpassed Mikolayev reached Voznesenk. Their goal will be to meet with Russian troops on the Moldovan border. From Kherson, Russian troops continue to advance in two directions north and west. Towards the north, the movement from Zaporiziya in the direction of Dnipro can continue its advance. The Russian Naval Blockade continues. Critical conflict continues in Mariupol. The south of Ukraine is largely under Russian control. If the Russians break the Ukrainian resistance in the Luhansk region in the eastern sector, the progress of the operation can be expected. Izium stands out in this region. Towards the north, the conflict continues in Kharkiv (Kharkov). Russian troops that will pass through Kharkiv can meet with the troops coming from the south in Dnipro, in the middle of the Belgrade-Crimea highway. In this case, about 7 Ukrainian Brigades may have to either withdraw or be forced towards annihilation. This is a very critical situation for the general state of the operation. In the north, troops crossing Sumi can be expected to advance towards the Kyiv region (towards Brovary). The siege in the Kyiv region will continue. In the following days of the operation (for example), if Dnipro is captured by the Russians and the Ukrainian resistance in the Donbass region is broken, a significant part of the troops in Kyiv can expand their operation from this region to the south. We can see this state of affairs in 3-6 weeks. Russian air operations continue to produce 170-210 sorties with tactical fighter-bombers. Strategic bombers are operating, albeit slightly. (To watch the map narrative, you can review the article titled Russia’s Probable Ukraine Operational Plan, which was published earlier.)
• War at the Strategic Level: Russia is posing a nuclear threat. The state of the war at the strategic level is at the level of “threatening”. Nuclear War is not expected.
• Shadow War: The assassination of the leader (Zelensky) is on the agenda.
• Cyber ​​War: Cyber ​​attacks are carried out mutually by Russia, the USA and the UK.
• The risk of the war spreading: Japan can be followed by bringing up the issue of the Kuril Islands.
  

Conclusion: “G+20” Ukraine War General Evaluation and Prospects

April stands out. The stage has been reached to increase the initiatives aimed at a general ceasefire on the parties. (38% level indicates a critical process.) If it is delayed, the situation becomes chronic, and even if there is a ceasefire, conflicts may continue in different areas. In order to control the situation, it is necessary to make good use of these cramped days ahead (G+30). If there is a lack of invitation to the parties for a ceasefire, the operation continues on the ground and the opportunity for a ceasefire may be lost for at least 3 months.

The support of the USA and its partners to Ukraine continues. Joe Biden has announced yet another aid package. It is clear that the USA and NATO will not enter this war. However, developments in Russia are closely followed by NATO. All kinds of (including nuclear) NATO plans are modified according to developments. NATO also makes new plans due to emerging energy and logistics problems. The NATO summit to be held on March 24 is considered important. The decision to be made may be in terms of putting more pressure on Russia. In addition, the leaders may be expected to make decisions on a roadmap to be implemented based on the texts that have emerged for the ceasefire, which is not very clear yet.

NOTE: Due to intellectual property rights, you can use this information by reference.

Gursel Tokmakoglu